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Article 9

A STUDY OF APPELLATE REVERSALS
Jon 0. Newman*
INTRODUCTION

It has been said that appellate judges and trial judges are
natural enemies. Having served in both capacities-nearly eight
years as a trial judge and now thirteen years as an appellate
judge-I do not think that aphorism is true. There is, however,
an undeniable basis for some tension between judges of trial and
appellate courts, borne of the structural relationship in which
they both function. Appellate judges have jurisdiction to reverse
the judgments entered by trial judges. When that authority is
exercised, the potential arises for some strain upon the normally
cordial relationships between trial and appellate judges.
This Article is an attempt to ease that strain by providing
some perspective on the process of appellate reversal. Like many
concepts, "reversal" is a general term that applies to widely differing occurrences. I have undertaken to examine a large group
of decisions of an appellate court and identify the various categories of decisions in which a "reversal" occurred. My basic
point is that a sounder basis for assessing the work of both appellate courts and trial courts is achieved by considering the various categories of cases in which the decision of an appellate
court alters in any way the judgment of a trial court, instead of
lumping them together under the all-encompassing rubric of
"reversal." Thus, I am not using the term "reversal" in the technical sense of an appellate judgment that requires the trial court
to rule in favor of the appellant. The "reversals" examined in
this study include dispositions that alter a trial court's judgment
in any way (reversing in whole or only in part) or remand for
further findings or for clarification.
Not surprisingly, I have examined decisions of the court on
which I serve, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. My review covered all Second Circuit decisions rendered during the two-year period from July 1, 1989 to June 30,
* Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
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1991.1

I was prompted to undertake this study by two circumstances. First, as a district judge, I was often asked, usually by
law students, how I felt when I was reversed. I would reply that
my reaction to a reversal depended on the grounds of the reversal. If I had been reversed for making a mistake on some matter
of routine trial procedure, like omitting a required portion of a
jury charge or excluding some obviously admissible evidence, I
would have been chagrined; in such circumstances, I would have
needlessly wasted the time of all the participants in that trial.
Fortunately, I could honestly have said that I had not been reversed for an "error" of that sort. On the other hand, if I had
been reversed because I rendered a legal decision on a close
question, like an interpretation of an ambiguous provision of a
newly enacted federal statute, and the Second Circuit resolved
the question differently, I would perhaps have been disappointed, but not the slightest bit distressed. Reasonable judges
will inevitably come out differently on close questions of law.
The hierarchical structure of a judicial system requires that even
a well-reasoned view of a trial judge will be displaced by the
well-reasoned view of a panel of appellate judges. But the questioning by those students started me thinking about categories
of reversals.
The second circumstance prompting this study occurred at
a judicial workshop of the Second Circuit a few years ago at
which, as a circuit judge, I participated on a panel with district
judges discussing aspects of the roles of our respective courts. A
district judge expressed the view that the reported rate of appellate reversals, most recently said to be about 14%,2 demonstrated that something was seriously wrong. As he put it, either
the district judges are not doing their jobs properly (by making
too many errors) or the circuit judges are not doing their jobs
properly (by reversing too many decisions that are not
I My law clerks during 1991-92, Claudia Hammerman and Victor Hong, helpfully
analyzed all of the dispositions by summary order; I analyzed all of the dispositions by
published opinion.
2 For the court year ending June 30, 1991, the Administrative Office of the United
States Courts reports that all the courts of appeals recorded 22,707 "terminations on the
merits" and reversed 2503 cases and remanded another 595, for an overall reversal .rate
of 13.6%. Admin. Off. U.S. Courts, Annual Report 177, tbl. B-5 (1991) [hereinafter AO
Annual Report].

19921

APPELLATE REVERSALS

erroneous).
I replied that I did not think the 14% reversal rate told us
anything about the quality of the job being done by either group
of judges. In fact, I continued, that rate might just indicate that
both groups are performing well-the trial judges are being affirmed in the overwhelming percentage of cases and perhaps being reversed only in the inevitable number of close calls where
reasonable judicial minds may differ. I suggested (admittedly
from my provincial perspective on the appellate court) that if
the reversal rate was high, it might well indicate that district
judges were not doing their jobs properly, and if the reversal
rate was low, it might well indicate that circuit judges were not
doing their jobs properly. But before I could assess the significance of the reported 14% reversal rate, I would have to know a
good deal more about the kinds of cases in which reversals were
occurring. Since then, I have discovered that there has been only
a single published study that systematically analyzes appellate
reversals, and it makes no attempt to categorize grounds of
reversals. 3
I. THE DATA
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, during the two
years of this study, was a court of thirteen active judges, who,
along with six senior judges, sit in panels of three to review judgments of the six district courts of the Second Circuit. The district courts encompass the four geographic districts of New York
and the single districts of Connecticut and Vermont. At the end
of the two years studied, there were forty-seven active and
twenty-eight senior district judges serving in those six districts.'
The study examined only appellate decisions rendered in apMargaret P. Mason, Note, Courting Reuersaf" The Supervisory Role of State Su-

preme Courts, 87 YALE LJ. 1191 (1978) (analyzing state supreme court reversals in the
aggregate and factoring in such variables as the nature of the parties, the complexity of

the case, the type of issues involved in the appeal and the area of law). Mason used data
first reported in Robert A. Kagan et aL, The Business of State Supreme Courts, 18701970, 30 STAN. L Rv. 121 (1977). The Kagan study, based on a sample of 5904 cases
decided by 16 state supreme courts between 1870 and 1970, outlined major trends in the
type and number of state supreme court cases during this period. It did not analyze
reversals.
' For the two years studied, 15 authorized district judgeship3 were unfilled. Second
Circuit Annual Report 72 (1991).
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peals from rulings of district courts; review of administrative
agency matters brought directly to the Second Circuit were not
considered (though social security matters, considered first by
the Social Security Administration and then by a district court,
were included). Also, appeals from district court judgments dismissed for lack of appellate jurisdiction were not included.
The study covered appellate decisions whether rendered in
published opinions or unpublished summary orders. 5 The aggregate results are set forth in Table 1.
Table 1
Aggregate Reversal (Including Remand) Data
July 1, 1989-June 30, 1991
Total dispositions (opinions and orders) .........
Affirmances ...................................
Reversals in whole ............................
Reversals in part ..............................
Reversals in whole or in part ...................
Total published opinions .......................
Reversals by published opinion .................
Total summary orders .........................
Reversals by summary order ...................
Total dispositions in civil cases .................
Reversals in civil cases .........................
Total dispositions in criminal cases .............
Reversals in criminal cases .....................

2025
1534
300
191
491
1002
459
1023
32
1336
362
689
129

(76%)
(15%)
( 9%)
(24%)
(46%)
( 3%)
(27%)
(19%)

For the two-year period there were 2025 appellate decisions and
491 reversals (in whole or in part), for an overall reversal rate of
24%. Of the total of 491 reversals, 191 were reversals in part.
Thus, the overall reversal rate can be restated to reflect that of
2025 appellate decisions, 300 (15%) were reversed in whole, and
191 (9%) were reversed in part. I should emphasize that my definition of "reversal" includes any alteration of a district court
judgment, whether to reverse or remand, in whole or in part.
As one would expect, the reversal rate was higher for decisions rendered by published opinion than by summary order. Of
1002 published opinions, 459 (46%) were reversals; of 1023 summary orders, 32 (3%) were reversals.

I

See 2d Cir. Rule § 0.23.
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The reversal rate was higher for civil cases than for criminal
cases. Of 1336 civil cases, 362 (27%) were reversed; of 689 criminal cases, 129 (19%) were reversed.
Far more significant, in my opinion, are the figures for categories of reversals. Before setting forth the data, I should acknowledge the imperfections of my categories. Categories of reversals can be formed in various ways. One way would be
primarily on a functional basis, for example, a category for interpretations of the Constitution and another category for remands
for more findings of fact. But categories can also be formed to
indicate the type of result required, for instance, a category for
reversals of judgments granting habeas corpus and another for
reversals of judgments denying habeas corpus. Obviously, every
ruling in a habeas corpus case could be said to involve an interpretation of the Constitution. Yet I thought it more informative
to group together certain types of results, such as those involving habeas corpus judgments, even though those reversals could
have been placed in the category involving interpretations of the
Constitution. Similarly, I have a category of reversals that reinstate dismissed complaints, although these cases could be considered interpretations of federal statutes (as are most of them).
But, again, it seemed more informative to show the group of reinstated complaints; these reversals usually mean the court of
appeals thought the complaint deserved some discovery, not
that there was a basic disagreement with a district court as to
the meaning of the statute on which the complaint was based.
Finally, reversals because of a jury charge often could be considered interpretations of a statute. Again, I have grouped them
separately, however, because these reversals rarely involve a fundamental disagreement about the meaning of a statute, but usually concern the need for a more correctly worded charge.
The categories of reversals, with the number for each category, are set forth in Table 2.
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Table 2
Categories of Reversals
Interpretation of Constitution ..........................
18
Interpretation of federal statute ........................
94
15
Interpretation of Sentencing Guidelines .................
Interpretation of contract ..............................
22
Interpretation of consent judgment .....................
4
Interpretation of state law .............................
17
59
Remand for findings ...................................
Summary judgment disallowed .........................
58
Complaint reinstated ..................................
18
Error in jury charge ...................................
14
Error in admitting evidence ............................
6
Error in excluding evidence ............................
3
Evidence insufficient ...................................
16
Rejection of directed verdict or j.n.o.v ...................
6
Finding of fact clearly erroneous ........................
7
Revision of dam ages ...................................
7
Habeas corpus rejected ................................
14
Habeas corpus required ................................
7
Sanctions disallowed ...................................
10
Qualified immunity upheld .............................
9
Qualified immunity disallowed ..........................
1
M iscellaneous ........................................
103
The largest category of reversals consists of interpretations
of a written document, usually a federal statute. There were 153
instances of such reversals; 18 involved the Constitution, 94 involved a federal statute, 15 involved the sentencing guidelines,
22 involved a contract and 4 involved a consent judgment. Similar to these disputes about legal interpretation were the 17 instances where a ruling on a point of state law was deemed
erroneous.
Two major categories involved remands for further proceedings, either to make additional findings or to permit the case to
advance beyond summary judgment. There were 59 instances
where a case was remanded for further findings. In 58 instances
a grant of summary judgment was set aside and the case remanded because of a triable issue of fact. In a similar vein, there
were 18 instances where a complaint was reinstated or the plaintiff was granted leave to amend the complaint.
There were comparatively few disagreements as to trial
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courts' assessment of facts, whether individual or in the aggregate: in 16 instances, a verdict or finding was rejected for insufficiency of the evidence; in 6 instances, a directed verdict or judgment n.o.v. was set aside; and in 7 instances, a finding of fact
was considered clearly erroneous. In 7 instances, damage computations were revised.
Conduct of a trial rarely precipitated a reversal. In 14 instances, a charge was held to be erroneous. Verdicts were set
aside in 6 instances because evidence was held to have been improperly admitted and in 3 instances because evidence was held
to have been improperly excluded.
The remaining categories that can be conveniently identified concern substantive outcomes. Reversals occurred in 14
habeas corpus cases; in 7 instances the denial of habeas corpus
was reversed (in whole or in part), and in 7 instances the grant
of habeas corpus was reversed (in whole or in part).
Sanctions decisions were reversed in 10 instances: 6 to vacate the imposition of Rule 11 sanctions, 2 to vacate dismissal as
a sanction, I to require the imposition of Rule 11 sanctions and
1 to require a contempt adjudication.
Qualified immunity rulings were reversed in 10 instances, 9
to uphold a defendant's claim of qualified immunity and 1 to
reject such a claim.
Regrettably, that leaves 103 "miscellaneous" reversals that
cannot usefully be placed in any identifiable category. These instances involved disagreements about a wide range of legal issues, for example, the application of res judicata or the exercise
of pendent jurisdiction.
Some further explanation should be made with respect to
the 129 instances of reversals in criminal cases. Many involved
sentencing appeals and a few involved successful appeals by the
prosecution of sentences or orders granting motions to suppress.
In 51 instances, a conviction on at least 1 count was vacated.
Thus, the reversal "rate" in criminal cases is more accurately
reported, not as the 19% of all 689 opinions in which some aspect of a criminal judgment was altered, but as the 7% in which
at least 1 count of a conviction was vacated. In 10 instances, the
Government prevailed on a criminal appeal, usually from a ruling granting a motion to suppress. Other criminal reversals involved remands for hearings.
Since sentencing appeals are primarily sentencing guidelines
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cases, the outcomes of those cases were separately examined.
There were 243 challenges to guideline sentences: 194 were affirmed and 49 were reversed or remanded. Of the 49 reversed or
remanded, 20 involved an absolute rejection of at least one aspect of the sentence and 29 involved a remand for further findings, clarification, or observance of procedures, such as notice of
departures. Thus, of the total of 243 appealed sentences, 194
(80%) were affirmed, 223 (92%) were permitted (by affirmance
or remand for findings), and 20 (8%) were not permitted (in
whole or in part).
Of the 41 departures that were appealed, 20 were affirmed,
11 were rejected and 10 were remanded for further findings. Of
the 32 upward departures, 17 were affirmed, 6 were rejected and
9 were remanded. Of the 9 downward departures, 3 were affirmed, 5 were rejected and 1 was remanded.
II.

REFLECTIONS

My first reaction to the data is that they reveal an overall
reversal rate significantly higher than the rate reported by the
Administrative Office of the United States Courts ("AO"). Some
reasons for the difference between the AO and my study are
readily apparent. First, the AO counts cases and I have counted
opinions, both published and unpublished. I was more interested
in counting and categorizing the opinions that accomplished a
reversal than the number of appellants who benefitted thereby.
One opinion may affirm or reverse the outcome of several appellate "cases," as occurs in an appeal from the joint trial of several
defendants. Second, the AO counts all cases, whether coming to
a court of appeals from district courts or administrative agencies. I have counted only cases coming from district courts, since
I was more interested in what the Second Circuit was doing with
respect to judgments of district courts.
For the statistical years 1990 and 1991 the AO reports that
a total of 2812 appeals in the Second Circuit terminated on the
merits, of which 346 were reversed or remanded, for a reversal
rate of 12%. 6 The AO's report of more appeals than my total of
opinions is readily understandable, as just explained. However,

AO Annual Report 177, supra note 2, at thl. B-S; id. at 121, tbl. B-5 (1990) (using
figures supplied by the courts).
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the AO's lower number and lower percentage of reversals are less
clear. Two possibilities occur to me. First, the AO figures include
a category called "other," which may include some of the reversals I have counted. The AO's "other" category for the two years
totals 83. Second, the AO reports 255 cases as "dismissed." I
would have thought that these cases are really dismissed for lack
of appellate jurisdiction, and hence excluded them from my
count as well, although it is possible that some AO "dismissals"
are included in my count of reversals. The AO reports a Second
Circuit reversal rate of 10.5% in 1990 and 4.5% in 1991; these
rates reflect only terminations categorized as "reversed" and do
not include those categorized as "remanded" or "other." If the
"reversed" and "remanded" categories are combined, the AO reversal rate for 1990 and 1991 is 12%, and if the "other" category
is included, the rate rises to 15%. That is still significantly below
the aggregate 24% reversal rate I have calculated. Part of the
difference is explained by the higher base the AO is using,
counting cases and not opinions. But part is not explainable;
even if all cases categorized by the AO as "reversed," "remanded," or "other" are combined, that total of 429 cases for
the two years is less than the 491 opinions I have counted in
which a judgment was reversed or remanded, in whole or in part.
So the reversal rate is higher than had been thought. The
related questions remain: Is it too high and does the rate reflect
that something is wrong with the performance of either the district courts or the Second Circuit, or both? I readily concede
that I am not an unbiased witness on either question, but I will
venture my conclusions nevertheless, confident that the reader
can make whatever discount is appropriate for my institutional
vantage (or disadvantage) point.
I am satisfied that the reversal rate is not too high. I form
that conclusion from a combination of two factors. The first is a
comparison of the aggregate reversals to the aggregate number
of judgments of the district courts. In the two years covered by
this study, the 6 district courts of the Second Circuit terminated
38,681 cases.' Thus, of all the judgments rendered by the district
In 1990 the six district courts terminated 18,105 civil cases, AO Annual Report
135, tbL C-1 (1990), and 2611 criminal cases, id. at 177, tbL D-1. In 1991, 15,349 civil
cases, id. at 188, tbL C-i (1991), and 2616 criminal cases, id. at 230, tbL D-1 (1991) were
terminated.
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courts, the reversals that occurred in 491 instances constituted
only 1%.8 As one would expect, at least in civil cases, some sort
of a market is working. Litigants and lawyers are accepting the
judgments of district courts in the overwhelming percentage of
cases, and are appealing only the group of cases for which there
appears to be some reasonable prospect of reversal. That the
Second Circuit rendered 2025 opinions and altered, in some way,
the judgment of a district court in 491 instances out of the
nearly 40,000 judgments available for challenge does not strike
me as an undue degree of oversight.
My second basis for considering the reversal rate reasonable
derives from my admittedly subjective assessment of the reversal opinions themselves (including the nearly one-quarter in
which I participated). I was impressed that the overwhelming
proportion of the reversals arose from disagreements between
the Second Circuit and a district court on a reasonably debatable point of law. Arguably, the number of reversals of that sort
indicates that the law is less determinate than one would wish,
but it does not indicate to me that either the district courts or
the Second Circuit are performing deficiently. I do not consider
the law unduly indeterminate when I notice that the Second Circuit altered in any way only 1% of all judgments rendered by
the district courts.
As significant as the large number of reversals on reasonably
debatable points of law was the extremely small number of reversals on what might be thought of as avoidable trial errors.
There were very few reversals for errors in the charge (14) or
errors in admitting (6) or excluding (3) evidence, and most that
occurred generally involved a fair dispute concerning unsettled
law. Also, there were very few reversals where the Second Circuit disagreed with the trial court's assessment of the facts in
the aggregate, as in reversing a count for insufficiency of the evidence (16) or in rejecting a directed verdict or a judgment n.o.v.
(6), or with regard to a particular finding, as in a reversal because of a finding deemed clearly erroneous (7). Though district
8 The time-frame for Second Circuit opinions is the same time-frame as district
court judgments, but obviously the lag time in perfecting appeals means that the judgments that were reviewed by the Second Circuit during 1990 and 1991 were not all rendered by the district courts in those years. That fact does not alter the significance of the
reversal rate when related to the total of all district court judgments.
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judges sometimes voice criticism of appellate judges for engaging
in "appellate fact-finding,"9 this study indicates how infrequently a district judge's finding of fact is deemed clearly
erroneous.
A significant number of reversals resulted from remands for
further findings (59), but I do not think the size of this group
reflects adversely on either the district courts or the Second Circuit. District courts are endeavoring to dispose of an oppressive
volume of cases. It is inevitable that in some instances they will
omit one or more findings that a reviewing court believes it requires in order to undertake proper review.
Two categories of reversals might be slightly higher than
warranted. In 58 instances, the Second Circuit reversed a grant
of summary judgment. Some of these involved a reasonable dispute about a close issue of law, but many occurred because the
Second Circuit concluded that a genuine issue of material fact
remained to be resolved, even though the governing legal principles were undisputed. Some cases of the latter sort can fairly be
called avoidable errors, but I do not fault the district courts for
precipitating this number of summary judgment reversals. I
have long believed, both as a district judge and as an appellate
judge, that district judges ought to grant summary judgment in
a few cases that are just a bit short of the traditional standards.
Often when they do so and write a persuasive opinion, the losing
side becomes convinced that its prospects of ultimate success are
too slight to justify an appeal and accepts its defeat. In such
cases, the district court is spared a trial and the court of appeals
is spared an appeal.
To know whether district courts are making excessive use of
this "leeway," one would have to know how many summary
judgments were being entered and not appealed and how many
of these were a bit short of traditional summary judgment standards. Then one would need to see if the few "extra" grants of
summary judgment that were being reversed were more than
justified by the number of "extra" grants of summary judgment
that were never appealed. Without the benefit of such knowledge, my intuition is that district judges are venturing to grant
"extra" summary judgments in an acceptable number of cases,

I See Gerard L. Goettel, Appellate Factfinding, 13 LrrG. 1, 7 (Fall 1986).
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precipitating a few extra appeals, but sparing their courts and
ours a considerably larger volume of business.
Similarly, with the 18 instances in which the dismissal of a
complaint was reversed (in whole or in part), though some cases
involved a reasonable dispute on an issue of law, only a few involved the reversal of a dismissal that should not have occurred.
This typically occurred with a pro se complaint that was dismissed too precipitously. As with grants of summary judgments,
I understand why busy district judges will occasionally act too
quickly. In the main, I think they spare themselves and the Second Circuit considerable business that ultimately will prove futile for plaintiffs by erring just a bit on the side of precipitous
dismissals of a complaint. Of course, they'must be careful, but
the relatively few precipitous dismissals that occurred seem to
justify what must be the large volume of "extra" dismissals that
were accepted and never pursued on appeal.
CONCLUSION

My overall assessment of the "reversal rate" is favorable
both to the district courts and the Second Circuit. Having examined all the opinions of two years that altered in any way the
judgment of a district court, I am satisfied that the 491 instances
of "reversal" are an appropriately low percentage of the nearly
40,000 judgments entered and an entirely acceptable percentage
of the 2025 opinions rendered by the Second Circuit. I admit
that I had that feeling before I began, but I am far more confident of that view after analyzing the various categories of reversals and remands. I hope that my colleagues on the district
courts agree.

